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The ConsTiTuTional sTaTus of The 
Double JeoparDy prinCiple
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This rule (or principle), which is sometimes referred to as the rule against 
double jeopardy, is but an aspect of the canon of fundamental fairness of 
legal procedures, inherent in our Constitution, which is expressed in the 
maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. 
IntroductIon
The	prncple	of	double	jeopardy	operates	as	a	proscrpton	aganst	retrals	for	
the	same	crmnal	offence	followng	a	tral	on	the	merts	by	a	court	of	competent	
crmnal	jursdcton	concludng	n	an	acquttal	or	convcton.2	The	prncple	
developed	at	common	law	n	response	to	the	draconan	punshments	tradtonally	
imposed on defendants and the deficiencies in medieval criminal procedure to the 
advantage	of	the	prosecuton.	The	common	law	mmunty	from	reprosecuton	
gradually	developed	n	response	to	the	njustce	n	permttng	retrals	for	the	
same	offence	 followng	 an	 acquttal	 or	 convcton.	The	 prncple	was	 also	
desgned	to	prevent	the	mposton	of	multple	punshments	for	the	same	crmnal	
transgresson	n	separate	proceedngs.	Typcally	ths	would	nclude	proceedngs	
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.	 The	People (DPP) v Quilligan (No 2)	[989]	Ir	46,	at	57	(SC),	per Henchy	J.	
The	maxm	nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa	stpulates	that	no	one	ought	to	
be	twce	troubled	or	harassed	for	one	and	the	same	cause,	or	rsk	beng	punshed	
twce	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.
2.	 a	court	of	competent	crmnal	jursdcton	s	one	establshed	by	the	Consttuton	
or	statute	to	determne	the	crmnal	charges	aganst	the	accused	and	to	mpose	the	
approprate	sentence	up	to	an	ncludng	the	statutory	maxma.	It	must	be	a	properly	
consttuted	court,	as	opposed	to	a	coram non judice,	and	must	not	have	acted	ultra 
vires	n	the	determnaton	of	the	gult	or	nnocence	of	the	accused.
.	 See	Jll	Hunter,	“The	development	of	the	rule	aganst	double	Jeopardy”	(984)	
5	Journal of Legal History	;	Jay	Sgler,	“a	Hstory	of	double	Jeopardy”	(96)	
7	American Journal of Legal History 28.
for the confiscation of criminal assets and the proceeds of crime, professional 
dscplnary	proceedngs,	and	occasonally	the	sentencng	process.4	
The	common	law	prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy	s	a	fundamental	rght	
of	the	accused	n	accordance	wth	the	rule	of	law.5	Wth	the	excepton	of	the	
Unted	Kngdom	and	australa,6	ths	fundamental	prncple	of	crmnal	justce	
and	procedure	has	been	elevated	to	consttutonal	status	n	most	common	law	
jursdctons	ncludng	the	Unted	States,7	Canada,8	New	Zealand,9	Inda,0	and	
South	afrca.	The	prncple	s	ncluded	n	most	european	consttutons2	and	
also	n	several	nternatonal	conventons,	where	t	s	known	as	the	prncple	
of	ne bis in idem.4	The	Irsh	Consttuton	does	not	nclude	an	express	provson	
4.	 The	ssue	here	s	that	f	a	defendant’s	convcton	s	quashed	and	a	retral	ordered	then,	
the	court,	when	mposng	sentence	on	reconvcton	must	take	nto	consderaton	
the	perod	of	mprsonment	served	on	the	ntal	albet	vod	convcton.	Lkewse,	
f	the	dPP	appeals	an	unduly	lenent	sentence	n	accordance	wth	secton	2	of	the	
Crmnal	Justce	act	99,	f	the	Court	of	Crmnal	appeal	quashes	the	orgnal	
sentence	mposed	by	the	tral	court	and	mposes	a	sentence	t	consders	approprate,	
the	defendant	must	be	credted	wth	tme	served	on	the	orgnal	sentence;	see	Gerard	
Coffey, “The Influence of Double Jeopardy on the Sentencing Process” (2006) 16 
ICLJ	8.
5.	 See	Joseph	raz,	“The	rule	of	Law	and	ts	Vrtue”	(977)	9	LQR 95;	TrS	allan,	
“The	rule	of	Law	as	the	rule	of	reason:	Consent	and	Consttutonalsm”	(999)	
5	LQR 22.
6.	 Legal	protecton	aganst	double	 jeopardy	 n	 these	 jursdctons	 s	based	on	 the	
common	law	pleas	n	bar	autrefois acquit	(formerly	acqutted)	and	autrefois convict	
(formerly	convcted).
7.	 Consttuton	of	the	Unted	States,	amendment	V.
8.	 Canadan	Charter	of	rghts	and	freedoms,	secton	(h).	
9.	 New	Zealand	Bll	of	rghts	act	990,	secton	26(2).	
0.	 Consttuton	of	Inda,	artcle	20(2).	
.	 Consttuton	of	the	republc	of	South	afrca,	artcle	5()(m).	
2.	 Basc	 Law	 of	 the	 federal	republc	 of	Germany,	artcle	 0();	Charter	 of	
fundamental	 rghts	 and	 freedoms	 of	 the	 Czech	 republc,	artcle	 40(5);	
Consttuton	of	the	republc	of	estona,	artcle	2();	Consttuton	of	the	republc	
of	Lthuana,	artcle	;	Consttuton	of	Malta,	artcle	9(9);	Consttuton	of	the	
Portuguese	republc,	artcle	 29(5);	Consttuton	of	 the	republc	 of	Slovena,	
artcle	;	Consttuton	of	the	Slovak	republc,	artcle	50(5).
.	 european	Conventon	on	Human	rghts,	Protocol	No	7,	artcle	4;	Internatonal	
Covenant	 on	Cvl	 and	 Poltcal	rghts,	artcle	 4(7);	rome	Statute	 of	 the	
Internatonal	Crmnal	Court,	artcle	20;	Charter	of	fundamental	rghts	of	the	
european	Unon,	artcle	50;	Conventon	Implementng	the	Schengen	agreement,	
artcle	54.
4.	 The	prncple	of	ne bis in idem stpulates	that	no	proceedng	can	be	nsttuted	twce	
for	the	same	cause	of	acton.	It	s	a	legal	concept	derved	from	Greek	and	roman	
civil law and reflects the common law double jeopardy principle in international 
law.	See	Chrstne	van	den	Wyngaert	and	Guy	Stessens,	“The	Internatonal	Non 
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aganst	double	jeopardy	and	therefore	the	consttutonal	status	of	the	protecton	
aganst	retrals	n	ths	jursdcton	s	uncertan.
Lberal	 democratc	 states	 provde	 for	 fundamental	 rghts	 by	 vrtue	 of	 a	
consttuton	or	bll	of	rghts,	the	nterpretaton	of	whch	s	a	fundamental	part	
of	the	legal	process.5	The	superor	courts	are	vested	wth	the	task	of	dentfyng	
the	ntent	of	the	framers	(orgnal	authors)	of	the	Consttuton	as	to	the	meanng	
and	 extent	 of	 ndvdual	 provsons,6 which may be modified over time.7	
Thus,	certan	rghts	may	be	mpled	n	accordance	wth	express	consttutonal	
provsons	as	determned	by	the	superor	courts.	There	are	many	fundamental	
consttutonal	 rghts	 of	 the	 accused	 n	 the	 crmnal	 justce	 process,	whch	
undoubtedly	nclude	the	common	law	mmunty	aganst	retrals.
Ths	artcle	evaluates	the	consttutonal	status	of	the	common	law	prncple	
aganst	retrals,	generally	referred	to	as	“the	rule	aganst	double	jeopardy.”	It	
examnes	 the	most	 relevant	provsons	of	 the	 Irsh	Consttuton	and	 judcal	
pronouncements	by	the	superor	courts	pertanng	to	the	consttutonal	status	
of	ths	fundamental	prncple	of	crmnal	justce.	The	rght	to	personal	lberty	
(artcle	40.4.°),	equalty	(artcle	40.),	personal	rghts	(40..°),	tral	by	jury	
(artcle	8.5)	and	far	procedures n	the	crmnal	justce	process	are	undoubtedly	
pertnent	to	the	consttutonal	status	of	the	double	jeopardy	prncple.8	However,	
the	 thess	 of	 ths	 artcle	 suggests	 that	 the	 consttutonal	mandate	 that	 trals	
proceed	“n	due	course	of	law”	(artcle	8.)	s	the	source	of	the	unenumerated	
consttutonal	rght	aganst	double	jeopardy.
Bis in Idem	 Prncple:	resolvng	Some	of	 the	Unanswered	Questons”	 (999)	
48	International and Comparative Law Quarterly	779;	Jennfer	Costa,	“double	
Jeopardy	and	Non Bis in Idem:	Prncples	of	farness”	 (998)	4	University of 
California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy	8;	Gerard	Coffey,	“The	
Prncple	of	Ne Bis in Idem	n	Crmnal	Proceedngs”	(2008)	8	ICLJ 2;	european	
Commission Green Paper on “Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of Ne Bis 
in Idem	n	Crmnal	Proceedngs”	CoM(2005)	696.
5.	 See	Bran	Walsh,	 “exstence	 and	Meanng	of	fundamental	rghts	 n	 Ireland”	
(980)		Human Rights Law Journal	7.	Cf	Lug	ferrajol,	“fundamental	rghts”	
(200)	4	International Journal for the Semiotics of Law	.
6.	 See	aleen	Kavanagh,	 “orgnal	 Intenton,	 enacted	Text,	 and	Consttutonal	
Interpretaton”	(2002)	47	American Journal of Jurisprudence	255;	raoul	Berger,	
“orgnalst	Theores	of	Interpretaton”	(988)	7	Cornell Law Review	5;	rchard	
Humphreys,	“Consttutonal	Interpretaton”	(99)	5	DULJ	59.
7.	 See	Wllam	rehnqust,	“The	Noton	of	a	Lvng	Consttuton”	(976)	54	Texas 
Law Review	 69;	Stephen	Munzer	 and	 James	Nckel,	 “does	 the	Consttuton	
Mean	What	t	always	Meant?”	(977)	77	Columbia Law Review	029;	aleen	
Kavanagh,	“The	Idea	of	a	Lvng	Consttuton”	(200)	26	Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence	55.
8.	 Whle	these	provsons	may	refer	to	the	“ctzen,”	as	a	general	rule	the	superor	
courts	have	accepted	that	these	are	unversal	rghts	for	all	human	persons	and	not	
necessarily confined by reference to ethnicity. 
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double Jeopardy law reform
In	vew	of	recent	statutory	reforms	n	the	Unted	Kngdom,9	New	South	Wales,20	
and	Queensland,2	t	s	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	double	jeopardy	prncple	
wll	be	revewed	n	ths	jursdcton	n	due	course.22	
double	jeopardy	law	reform	n	the	Unted	Kngdom	has	been	the	model	
for	reform	n	other	common	law	jursdctons.	The	spur	to	reform	n	the	Unted	
Kingdom was the failed prosecution of five youths alleged to have murdered 
Stephen	Lawrence	 n	99.	The accused	were	acqutted	prncpally	because	
of	polce	ncompetence	n	the	nvestgaton	of	the	murder	and	the	neffectve	
prosecuton	of	the	case	by	the	prosecutng	authortes.2	as	a	consequence	of	ths	
case,	the	then	Home	Secretary,	Mr	Jack	Straw	MP,	establshed	the	Macpherson 
Inquiry,24	to	revew	the	polce	nvestgaton,	alleged	nsttutonal	racsm,	and	the	
faled	prosecuton	of	the	case.	The	report	of	the	Macpherson	Inquiry	produced	
many	 recommendatons	 ncludng	 the	 proposed	 reform	of	 the	 common	 law	
prncple	 aganst	 double	 jeopardy	 n	 crcumstances	where	 fresh	 and	 vable	
evdence	of	an	accused’s	gult	s	dscovered	followng	an	acquttal.25	The	Law	
Commsson	subsequently	publshed	a	Consultaton	Paper26	and	report,27	whch	
revewed	the	common	law	double	jeopardy	prncple.	Part	0	of	the	Crmnal	
Justice Act 2003 modified the law in the United Kingdom with the result that an 
acquttal	may	be	revewed	by	the	Court	of	appeal	(Crmnal	dvson)	n	vew	
of	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	of	the	accused’s	gult	and	a	retral	ordered	
for	the	same	offence.
The first acquittal to be challenged was that of William “Billy” Dunlop, who 
had formerly been twice tried for murder; in the first instance the jury failed 
to	agree	on	a	verdct	 and	he	was	acqutted	 followng	a	 retral.	The	accused	
9.	 Crmnal	Justce	act	200,	Part	0.
20.	 Crmes	(appeal	and	revew)	amendment	(double	Jeopardy)	act	2006.	
2.	 Crmnal	Code	(double	Jeopardy)	amendment	act	2007.
22.	 See	comments	by	the	Mnster	for	Justce,	equalty	and	Law	reform	pertanng	to	
the	proposed	statutory	reform	of	the	double	jeopardy	prncple	n	ths	jursdcton,	
“dermot	ahern	announces	Justce	for	Vctms	Intatve”	www.justce.e/en/JeLr/
Pages/dermot%20ahern%20announces%20Justce%20for%20Vctms%20Inta
tve	(vsted	26	august	2008).
2.	 See	 Lee	Brdges,	 “The	 Lawrence	 Inqury:	 Incompetence,	 Corrupton,	 and	
Insttutonal	racsm”	(999)	26	Journal of Law and Society	298.
24.	 Macpherson	Inqury,	The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir 
William Macpherson of Cluny (Cm	4262,	999).
25.	 Ibid,	recommendaton	8	states:	“That	consderaton	should	be	gven	to	the	Court	
of	appeal	beng	gven	power	to	permt	prosecuton	after	acquttal	where	fresh	and	
vable	evdence	s	presented.”	
26.	 Law	Commsson,	Double Jeopardy: A Consultation Paper	(CP	No	56,	999).
27.	 Law	Commsson,	Double Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals	(report	No	267,	
Cm	5048,	200).	
42	 Dublin University Law Journal [Vol	0
subsequently confessed to the murder to a prison officer in a taped conversation 
whle	servng	a	seven-year	term	of	mprsonment	for	a	serous	assault	on	another	
vctm.	He	was	convcted	n	2000	for	perjury.	In	2005,	the	Crown	Prosecuton	
Servce	referred	the	case	to	the	Court	of	appeal	(Crmnal	dvson),	whch	
now	has	the	power	to	quash	an	acquttal	and	order	a	retral	where	there	s	fresh	
and	compellng	evdence	of	gult.	The	accused	pleaded	gulty	to	the	murder	
for	whch	he	had	been	formerly	acqutted,	and	n	2006	was	sentenced	to	lfe	
mprsonment.	
The	 dlemma	 for	 ths	 jursdcton	 s	whether	 the	oreachtas	would	 be	
permtted	 to	 enact	 reformng	 legslaton	 that	would	make	provson	 for	 the	
prosecuton	authortes	to	appeal	an	acquttal	based	on	fresh	and	compellng	
evdence	of	the	accused’s	gult	n	order	that	a	retral	could	proceed	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence.	
trIal In due course of law
artcle	8.	provdes	that	“no	person	shall	be	tred	on	any	crmnal	charge	save	
n	due	course	of	law,”	whch ncorporates	the	common	law	prncple	aganst	
double	 jeopardy.28	Ths	 provson	 s	 applcable	 to	 trals	 on	 ndctment29	 and	
summary	trals,0	therefore	ssues	of	nequalty	n	the	crmnal	justce	process	
would	not	arse	 n	 the	scope	and	applcaton	of	 the	consttutonal	protecton	
aganst	double	jeopardy.	
a	promnent	feature	of	the	varous	judcal	statements	pertanng	to	double	
jeopardy	jursprudence	s	the	uncertanty	wth	regard	to	the	legal	bass	of	the	
prncple.	Typcally,	judcal	statements	have	based	the	prncple	exclusvely	on	
the	common	law,	although	t	must	be	emphassed	that	the	Irsh	superor	courts	
have	not	been	afforded	 the	approprate	opportunty	 to	consder	 ths	 ssue	 n	
greater	detal	due	to	the	relatve	lack	of	ltgaton	concernng	double	jeopardy	
law	 n	 the	 jursdcton.	Consequently,	 judcal	 statements	 pertanng	 to	 ths	
fundamental	prncple	of	crmnal	justce	and	procedure	have	not	necessarly	
been definitive. This may be contrasted with other common law jurisdictions, 
28.	 James	Casey,	Constitutional Law in	Ireland	(rd	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2000),	at	
59,	wrtes:	“Ths	common	law	rule	was	enshrned	n	the	ffth	amendment	of	the	
amercan	Consttuton	and	t	has,	lke	the	prvlege	aganst	self-ncrmnaton,	been	
held	bndng	on	the	States	via	the	fourteenth	amendment’s	due	process	clause	
….	No	doubt	artcle	8.’s	guarantee	of	tral	n	due	course	of	law	ncorporates	
a	smlar	dea	…”;	see	also	Gerard	Hogan	and	Gerard	Whyte	eds,	JM Kelly: The 
Irish Constitution (4th	ed,	Tottel	Publshng,	200),	at	05-064;	Paul	anthony	
Mcdermott,	Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy	(Butterworths,	999),	at	208;	Tom	
o’Malley,	“Prosecuton	appeals	aganst	Sentence”	(99)		ILT 2,	at	2.
29.	 The People (DPP) v O’Shea	[982]	Ir	84	(SC).
0.	 Attorney General (Ó Maonaigh) v Fitzgerald	[964]	Ir	458	(SC).
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prncpally	the	Unted	States,	where	double	jeopardy	jursprudence	has	been	
developed	n	many	decsons	of	the	superor	courts.	Unlke	the	Consttuton	of	the	
Unted	States,	the	Irsh	Consttuton	does	not	have	an	express	provson	aganst	
placng	an	accused	twce	n	jeopardy	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.	However,	
as	wll	be	seen,	t	s	mplct	from	the	superor	Court’s	readng	of	artcle	8.	
that	ths	fundamental	prncple	of	crmnal	justce	has	consttutonal	status.
Whle	artcle	8.	does	not	delneate	the	exact	scope	of	a	tral	“n	due	course	
of law,” the superior courts have identified fundamental rights to fair procedures 
n	 accordance	wth	 the	 requrement	of	 a	 far	 crmnal	 tral.	Ths	provson	
has	been	nterpreted	so	as	to	provde	for	multfarous	rghts	to	safeguard	the	
presumpton	of	nnocence	of	the	accused	and	to	ensure	the	ntegrty	of	a	far	
tral.2	The	 judcal	consderatons	of	 ths	consttutonal	provson	have	been	
summarsed	n	the	followng	terms:
The	 phrase	 “due	 course	 of	 law”	may	 therefore	 be	 best	 regarded	 as	
conveyng	 a	 bundle	 of	 prncples	 and	maxms	more	 or	 less	 generally	
accepted	n	the	common	law	world,	most	of	them	ancent,	some	of	them	
of modern origin, although the scope of the guarantee is not confined or 
crcumscrbed	by	 ts	 common	 law	 roots.	Some	of	 these	prncples	 are	
so	well	establshed	and	so	much	taken	for	granted	that	t	s	not	easy	to	
llustrate	them	by	reference	to	recent	nstances	n	whch	Irsh	courts	have	
found it necessary to affirm them. 
once	the	accused	has	been	tred	before	a	court	of	competent	crmnal	jursdcton	
and	ether	acqutted	or	convcted	followng	a	tral	on	the	merts,	a	retral	for	
the	same	crmnal	offence	would	consttute	an	nfrngement	of	artcle	8..	a	
purported	retral	for	the	same	offence	n	these	crcumstances	would	consttute	
an	nfrngement	not	only	of	the	common	law	prncple	aganst	retrals	but	also	
the	accused’s	consttutonal	rght	to	a	tral	“n	due	course	of	law.”
The constitutional protection against retrials is predicated on a final verdict of 
acquttal	or	convcton	followng	a	tral	on	the	merts.4	Ths	ssue	was	consdered	
.	 See	declan	McGrath,	 “Tral	 n	due	Course	 of	Law”	 n	Wllam	Bnchy	 and	
Catherne	fnnegan	 eds,	Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the Judiciary: 
Tanzanian and Irish Perspectives (Clarus	Press,	2006),	at	27-5.
2.	 The	 rght	 to	 a	 far	 tral	 s	 also	 provded	 for	 by	artcle	 6()	 of	 the	european	
Conventon	on	Human	rghts;	see	andrew	ashworth,	“artcle	6	and	the	farness	
of	Trals”	(999)	Crim LR 26.
.	 Hogan	and	Whyte,	note	28,	at	050;	see	also	Report of the Constitution Group	
(Stationery Office, 1996), at 191. 
4. The following criteria must be satisfied before the special pleas in bar can be raised 
aganst	a	retral:	()	jeopardy,	or	perl	of	convcton,	had	attached	to	the	former	
criminal trial; (2) a final verdict acquittal or conviction following a trial on the 
merts;	()	the	second	tral	(retral)	s	for	the	same	or	substantally	same	crmnal	
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n	The People (DPP) v Quilligan (No 2),	where	Walsh	J	stated:
artcle	8.	of	the	Consttuton	provdes	that	no	person	shall	be	tred	on	any	
crmnal	charge	save	n	due	course	of	law.	That	does	not	confer	any	rght	
upon	an	accused	person	to	clam	that	a	tral	whch	was	manfestly	not	n	
due	course	of	law	should	be	a	bar	to	a	tral	whch	would	be	n	due	course	
of law where the verdict reached in the first trial is set aside. An acquittal 
on	the	merts	ncludes	an	acquttal	on	all	legal	pleas	or	defences….5	
Consequently,	n	crcumstances	where	the	former	crmnal	tral	was	defectve,	
perhaps	due	to	jury	or	wtness	ntmdaton	or	brbery,	or	where	the	former	tral	
court	was	subsequently	deemed	a	coram non judice,	a	retral	would	not consttute	
an	nfrngement	of	the	consttutonal	rght	aganst	double	jeopardy.
There	has	been	a	dvergence	of	judcal	opnon	regardng	the	legal	bass	of	
the	double	jeopardy	prncple	n	the	Irsh	crmnal	justce	system.
Cases suggesting a Common law principle
In	The State (Tynan) v District Justice Keane,6 the	applcant	referred	to	the	ffth	
amendment	to	the	Unted	States	Consttuton	n	support	of	hs	double	jeopardy	
plea	under	Irsh	law	and	the	Supreme	Court	inter alia reled	on	Unted	States	
case	law	n	determnng	the	ssue.	Walsh	J	stated:
The	applcant’s	case	was	based	upon	the	broad	general	prncples	of	the	
common	law	–	that	a	man	shall	not	be	twce	vexed	for	one	and	the	same	
cause,	that	a	man	ought	not	to	be	punshed	twce	for	the	same	offence,	and	
that	a	man	s	not	to	be	put	twce	n	perl	-	and	reference	was	made	to	the	
ffth	amendment	of	the	Consttuton	of	the	Unted	States	that	‘nor	shall	
any	person	be	subject	for	the	same	offence	to	be	twce	put	n	jeopardy	of	
lfe	or	lmb….’	The	last	provson	was	referred	to	as	beng	a	statement	of	
the	general	prncple	reled	upon	by	the	applcant.7	
He	concluded	that	“[]n	ths	country…	the	power	vested	n	the	Court	of	Crmnal	
appeal	 to	 order	 a	 retral	 upon	 the	 quashng	 of	 a	 convcton	 s	 also	 a	 clear	
ndcaton	that	ths	prncple	s	not	a	fundamental	prncple	of	law.”8
offence.	See	edward	ryan	and	Phlp	Magee,	The Irish Criminal Process	(Mercer	
Press,	98),	at	272-275;	dermot	Walsh,	Criminal Procedure	(Thomson	round	
Hall,	2002),	at	784-795;	Gerard	Coffey,	“rasng	the	Pleas	n	Bar	aganst	a	retral	
for	the	Same	Crmnal	offence”	(2005)	5	JSIJ 24.
5.	 [989]	Ir	46,	at	50	(SC).
6.	 [968]	Ir	48	(SC).	
7.	 Ibid,	at	54	(SC).
8.	 Ibid,	at	55	(SC).
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In	the	judgment	of	Walsh	J	there	s	“a	clear	ndcaton”	that	the	common	
law	prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy	s	“not	a	fundamental	prncple	of	law,”	
whch	ndcates	that	t	does	not	have	consttutonal	status.	However,	Walsh	J	
was	speakng	of	a	retral	followng	the	quashng	of	a	convcton	by	the	Court	of	
Crmnal	appeal.	a	retral	n	these	crcumstances	s	based	on	statute	law,9	whch	
may render this judicial statement confined to the facts of the case. 
In	vew	of	 the	close	smlartes	between	 the	consttutons	of	 the	Unted	
States	and	Ireland,	double	jeopardy	jursprudence	emanatng	from	the	Unted	
States Supreme Court would have significant persuasive authority when the 
consttutonal	 status	 of	 the	 double	 jeopardy	 prncple	 s	 consdered	 by	 the	
Irsh	superor	courts.40	In	Conroy v Attorney General,4	Kenny	J	descrbed	the	
hstorcal	orgn	of	 the	underlyng	 ratonale	of	artcle	8.	 n	 the	 followng	
terms:
…	secton		of	the	artcle	s	an	echo	of	the	clause	n	the	great	charter	of	
Ireland	granted	n	26….	[The]	phrase	“due	process	of	law”	was	adopted	
by	those	who	drafted	the	ffth	amendment	to	the	Consttuton	of	the	Unted	
States	of	amerca	whch	prevents	any	person	beng	deprved	of	lfe,	lberty	
or	property	wthout	due	process	of	law.	I	thnk	that	secton		of	the	artcle	
gves	a	consttutonal	rght	to	every	person	to	be	tred	n	accordance	wth	
the	law	and	n	accordance	wth	due	course	or	due	process	of	law.42	
The	 jursprudence	 of	 the	Unted	 States	 Supreme	Court	 pertanng	 to	 the	
scope	and	applcaton	of	the	prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy,	although	not	
binding in this jurisdiction, would undoubtedly provide influential assistance 
n	the	nterpretaton	of	artcle	8.	as	beng	the	source	of	ths	unenumerated	
consttutonal	rght.	The	prohbton	aganst	double	jeopardy	s	an	entrenched	
rght	 n	 the	Unted	States	Consttuton	 by	 vrtue	 of	 the	ffth	amendment,	
therefore	Unted	States	 case	 law	on	double	 jeopardy	 jursprudence	must	be	
read	wth	a	certan	degree	of	crcumspecton	as	an	unenumerated	consttutonal	
rght	 aganst	 double	 jeopardy	would	not	necessarly	provde	 the	 same	 level	
9.	 Crmnal	Procedure	act	99,	secton	()(c)	and	secton	4;	Courts	of	Justce	act	
928,	secton	5(2).
40.	 Paul	o’Mahony,	 “The	Consttuton	and	Crmnal	 Justce”	 n	Tm	Murphy	and	
Patrck	Twomey	eds,	Ireland’s Evolving Constitution, 1937-1997: Collected Essays 
(Hart	Publshng,	999),	8,	at	84,	wrtes:	“It	s	lkely	that	the	Consttuton	of	
the	Unted	States	was	an	mportant	model	for	de	Valera	and	other	framers	of	the	
Irsh	Consttuton,	and	both	Consttutons	are	most	obvously	successful	at	 the	
work	of	fashonng	governmental	structures.”
4.	 [965]	Ir	4	(HC	&	SC).
42.	 [965]	Ir	4,	at	45.	In	Goodman International v Hamilton	(No 1) [992]	2	Ir	
542	(HC	&	SC),	at	609,	McCarthy	J	stated	that	artcle	8.	was	“an	echo	of	the	
phrase	‘due	process	of	law’	n	the	ffth	amendment	of	the	US	Consttuton.”
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of protection as a specified right; unspecified constitutional rights are not 
“entrenched”	aganst	legslatve	encroachment.4
In	O’Leary v	Cunningham,	 the	Supreme	Court	based	 the	plea	of	double	
jeopardy, or more specifically a former acquittal, on the common law. Kenny 
J	stated:
It	was	submtted	for	the	defendant…	that	the	Crcut	Court	judge	could	
not find the defendant guilty of robbery because he had been in jeopardy 
of	convcton	on	that	charge	n	the	dstrct	Court	and,	as	he	was	found	not	
guilty of it by the District Judge, the defendant was entitled to the benefit 
of	the	doctrne	of	autrefois acquit	n	relaton	to	the	robbery	charge.	No	
authortes	n	support	of	ths	contenton	were	cted	but,	after	much	anxous	
consderaton,	I	have	come	to	the	concluson	that	t	s	correct.	“It	s	an	
establshed	rule	of	the	common	law	that	a	man	may	not	be	put	twce	n	
perl	for	the	same	offence….”	Ths	s	the	bass	of	autrefois acquit.44
In	vew	of	the	fact	that	the	Court	dd	not	consder	the	consttutonal	status	of	
double	jeopardy,	ths	judcal	reluctance	may	be	ndcatve	that	the	Court	dd	
not	consder	the	prncple	to	be	an	unenumerated	consttutonal	rght.	
In	The People (DPP) v O’Shea,	o’Hggns	CJ	stated	that	“the	plea	s	founded	
on	natural	 justce	 and	 s	 based	on	 the	 common-law	maxm	nemo debet bis 
vexari… pro una et eadem causa.”45	To	prosecute	and	punsh	an	accused	on	
more	than	one	occason	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	would	ndeed	consttute	
a	volaton	of	the	basc	tenets	of	natural	(consttutonal)	justce.	
Thus,	whle	 the	 superor	 courts	 readly	 acknowledged	 the	 common	 law	
prncple	aganst	retrals,	there	appears	to	have	been	a	certan	degree	of	judcal	
uncertanty	wth	 regard	 to	 the	 consttutonal	 status	 of	 the	 double	 jeopardy	
prncple.
Cases suggesting a Constitutional right
Whle	the	judgment	by	Walsh	J	n	The State (Tynan) v Keane,46	ndcates	that	
the	common	law	prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy	may	not	have	consttutonal	
status,	over	two	decades	later	n	The People (DPP) v Quilligan (No 2),47	the	
Supreme	Court	 ndcated	 that	 the	 prncple	 does	 ndeed	have	 consttutonal	
status.	Henchy	J	explaned	that:	
The	rule	of	autrefois acquit	means	that	f	an	accused	duly	and	successfully	
4.	 Cf	Gary	dBanco,	“Truly	Consttutonal?	The	amercan	double	Jeopardy	Clause	
and	ts	australan	analogues”	(995)		American Criminal Law Review	2.
44.	 [980]	Ir	67,	at	78	(SC).
45.	 [982]	Ir	85,	at	406	(SC).
46.	 [968]	Ir	48	(SC).
47.	 [989]	Ir	46	(SC).
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rases	the	plea	that	he	has	already	been	tred	n	a	court	of	competent	jursdcton,	
actng	wthn	 jursdcton,	 for	 the	 offence	 now	 charged,	 and	 that	 he	was	
acqutted	of	that	charge	n	that	court,	the	second	tral	for	that	offence	may	not	
take	place.48
He	then	descrbed	the	specal	plea	n	bar,	autrefois acquit,	as	“an	aspect	
of	 the	 canon	 of	 fundamental	 farness	 of	 legal	 procedures,	 nherent	 n	 our	
Consttuton,”49	thus	effectvely	conferrng	consttutonal	status	on	the	double	
jeopardy	prncple.	
The	consttutonal	bass	for	the	double	jeopardy	prncple,	n	the	requrement	
of	farness	of	procedures	nherent	n	the	Consttuton,	would	suggest	that	the	
prohbton	s	mplct	n	artcle	8.	as	an	essental	requrement	of	a	far	tral.50	
In	Feeney v District Justice Clifford,	Barr	J	stated:
…	 f	 the	 respondent	 decded	 to	 convct	 the	 applcant	 of	 the	 offences	
charged	and,	havng	heard	evdence	of	prevous	convctons	and	sentences,	
then	became	aware	that	he	could	not	mpose	a	custodal	sentence	whch	
he	regarded	as	beng	approprate	n	all	the	crcumstances,	he	would	not	
be	enttled	at	that	stage	to	change	hs	mnd	and	decde	that	the	charges	n	
question were not fit to be tried summarily, as that would create a situation 
of	double	jeopardy	whch	would	deprve	the	defendant	of	hs	consttutonal	
rght	to	far	procedures.5
Thus,	the	consttutonal	protecton	aganst	double	jeopardy	s	an	nherent	due	
process	value	n	the	crmnal	justce	process.	
The most decisive judicial statement pertaining to the unspecified right 
aganst	double	jeopardy	as	an	aspect	of	artcle	8.	was	provded	n	Heaney 
v Ireland.52	The	plantff	clamed	 that	certan	common	 law	prncples	 n	 the	
criminal justice process have been identified as unenumerated constitutional 
rghts	and	referred	to	artcle	8.	as	beng	the	source	of	these	rghts.	The	Hgh	
Court	per	Costello	J	explaned	that	ths	provson:
…	mples	a	great	deal	more	than	a	smple	asserton	that	trals	are	to	be	held	
n	accordance	wth	laws	enacted	by	parlament.	It	s	an	artcle	couched	n	
pre-emptory	language	and	has	been	construed	as	a	consttutonal	guarantee	
48.	 Ibid,	at	57.
49.	 Ibid,	at	57.
50.	 In	Donnelly v Ireland [998]		Ir	2,	at	50	(SC),	Hamlton	CJ	stated:	“…the	
words	‘n	due	course	of	law’	n	artcle	8.	of	the	Consttuton	make	t	mandatory	
that	every	crmnal	tral	shall	be	conducted	n	accordance	wth	the	concept	of	justce,	
that	the	procedures	shall	be	far	and	that	the	person	accused	wll	be	afforded	the	
opportunty	to	defend	hmself.”
5.	 [989]	Ir	668	(HC),	at	67.
52.	 [994]		Ir	59	(HC).
48	 Dublin University Law Journal [Vol	0
that	crmnal	trals	wll	be	conducted	n	accordance	wth	basc	concepts	
of	justce.	Those	basc	prncples	may	be	of	ancent	orgn	and	part	of	the	
long	establshed	prncples	of	the	common	law,	or	they	may	be	of	more	
recent	orgn	and	wdely	accepted	n	other	jursdctons	and	recognsed	n	
nternatonal	conventons	as	a	basc	requrement	of	a	far	tral.	Thus,	the	
prncple	that	an	accused	s	enttled	to	the	presumpton	of	nnocence,	that	
an	accused	cannot	be	tred	for	an	offence	unknown	to	the	law,	or charged 
a second time with the same offence,	the	prncple	that	an	accused	must	
know	the	case	he	has	to	meet	and	that	evdence	llegally	obtaned	wll	
generally	speakng	be	nadmssble	at	hs	tral,	are	all	prncples	whch	
are	so	basc	to	the	concept	of	a	far	tral	that	they	obtan	consttutonal	
protecton	from	ths	artcle.5
Thus, Costello J affirmed the constitutional status of the double jeopardy 
principle as one of the unspecified fundamental rights of the accused in 
accordance	wth	artcle	8..
In	The State (O’Callaghan) v O’hUadhaigh,54	the	Hgh	Court	approved	an	
order	of	prohbton	to	prevent	the	tral	of	the	accused	on	charges	n	respect	of	
whch	the	prosecuton	had	entered	a	nolle prosequi.	fnlay	P	held	that	that	to	
permt	a	fresh	prosecuton	would:
…	create	such	an	extraordnary	mbalance	between	the	rghts	and	powers	
of	the	prosecuton	and	those	of	the	accused	respectvely,	and…	gve	the	
drector	such	a	relatve	ndependence	from	the	decson	of	the	court	n	
any	tral,	would	be	to	concur	n	a	proposton	of	law	whch	sgnally	faled	
to	mport	farness	and	far	procedure.55
Therefore,	f	an	accused	s	deprved	of	the	rght	to	far	procedures	durng	the	
course	of	a	crmnal	tral	ths	could	consttute	a	volaton	of	the	consttutonal	
rght	 to	 a	 tral	 “n	 due	 course	 of	 law”	 as	mandated	 by	artcle	 8..	 In	
O’hUadhaigh,	ths	was	extended	to	preventng	the	prosecuton	from	ndctng	
the	accused	on	a	second	occason	for	the	same	crmnal	offence,	especally	n	
consderaton	of	the	fact	that	the	accused	could	not	termnate	the	crmnal	tral	
n	the	same	manner	as	the	prosecutng	authortes.	Whle	a	nolle	prosequi	s	
generally insufficient to raise the plea of autrefois acquit,	whch	s	predcated	
on a final verdict of acquittal, in this instance the prosecution had entered a 
nolle prosequi	apparently	for	the	sole	purpose	of	avodng	a	rulng	by	the	tral	
court	n	the	accused’s	favour.	The	rulng	n	O’hUadhaigh	has	been	descrbed	
as	provdng	a	“lmted	guarantee	aganst	double	jeopardy.”56	
5.	 Ibid,	at	605.	emphass	added.
54.	 [977]	Ir	42	(HC).
55.	 Ibid,	at	54.
56.	 Mchael	forde,	Constitutional Law (2nd	ed,	frstLaw,	2004),	at	47.
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In	Considine v Shannon Regional Fisheries Board,57	 the	plantff	argued	
that in the absence of a specified constitutional right against double jeopardy, 
artcles	8.	and	40..°	provde	an	unenumerated	consttutonal	 mmunty	
aganst	retrals	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.58	The	plantff	further	argued	that	
the	 prncple	 aganst	 double	 jeopardy	 s	 a	 fundamental	 rght	 mplct	 n	 the	
Consttuton.59	Hamlton	CJ,	havng	referred	to	the	plantff’s	clam	that	artcle	
8.	s	the	source	of	the	consttutonal	rght	to	double	jeopardy	protecton,	sad	
“[]t	s,	however,	clear	from	a	consderaton	of	all	the	authortes	that,	whle	ths	
was	the	general	rule,	t	was	subject	to	the	rght	of	the	legslature	to	provde	for	
an appeal in specified cases.”60
He	concluded:	
…	the	common	law	rule	that	there	should	be	no	appeal	from	an	acquttal	of	
a	crmnal	charge	was	subject	to	the	rght	of	the	legslature	to	provde	for	
such	an	appeal	provded	that	such	rght	was	gven	n	clear	and	unambguous	
language	and	that	a	tral	“n	due	course	of	law”	dd	not	necessarly	nvolve	
the	precluson	of	a	rght	of	appeal	n	the	event	of	an	acquttal.6
although	 ths	decson	pertans	 to	 the	appellate	process	 rather	 than	a	 retral	
followng	an	acquttal	by	a	court	of	competent	crmnal	jursdcton,	Hamlton	
CJ appears	to	have	endorsed	the	consttutonal	status	of	the	double	jeopardy	
prncple.62
The	consttutonal	status	of	double	jeopardy	was	consdered	n	S(D) v Judges 
of the Cork Circuit and the DPP,6	where	 the	applcant	sought	a	permanent	
njuncton	aganst	the	respondents	from	prosecutng	hm	as	he	had	prevously	
been	tred	twce	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.	However,	the	former	two	trals	
had	not	concluded	wth	a	verdct	of	acquttal	or	convcton	as	the	jury	could	not	
agree.	The	applcant	submtted	that	a	purported	thrd	tral	for	the	same	offence	
57.	 [997]	2	Ir	404	(SC).
58.	 The	plantff	proceeded	wth	a	consttutonal	challenge	argung	that	secton	0	
of	the	fsheres	(Consoldaton)	act	959,	was	unconsttutonal	as	t	allowed	the	
dPP	to	appeal	a	dsmssal	n	the	dstrct	Court	to	the	Crcut	Court.
59.	 [997]	2	Ir	404	(SC),	at	40.	Counsel	for	the	plantff	submtted	“[w]hle	there	s	
no	express	provson	n	our	Consttuton	whch	provdes	mmunty	for	the	ctzen	
aganst	double	jeopardy,	there	are	certan	rghts	of	natural	law	whch	are	antecedent	
to	the	Consttuton.	In	the	lght	of	those	rghts,	the	combned	effect	of	[artcle	
40..º]	and	artcle	8.	s	to	provde	such	mmunty.”
60.	 [997]	2	Ir	404	(SC),	at	420.	
6.	 Ibid,	at	42.
62.	 Tom	o’Malley,	Sentencing Law and Practice (round	Hall,	2000),	at	82,	referrng	
to	Considine wrtes	“[t]he	court	stopped	short	of	conferrng	consttutonal	status	
on	the	rule	aganst	double	jeopardy,	although	t	readly	acknowledged	ts	common	
law	exstence.”
6.	 6	october	2006	(HC).
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n	these	crcumstances	would	nfrnge	hs	rght	to	a	far	tral.	The	Hgh	Court	
held	that	a	thrd	tral	n	these	crcumstances	would	not	consttute	a	tral	“n	due	
course	of	law.”	o’Nell	J	stated:
…	the	ancent	common	law	prohbton	on	multple	trals	known	as	the	
double	jeopardy	prncple	has	applcaton	to	ths	case,	although	t	mght	
more	aptly	be	descrbed	as	the	trple	jeopardy	prncple.	It	follows	that	a	
thrd	tral	of	a	person	for	the	same	offence	where	n	the	two	prevous	trals	
a	jury	has	dsagreed,	would	not	n	my	opnon	be	a	tral	n	due	course	of	
law	as	requred	by	artcle	8()	of	the	Consttuton.
However,	 n	 ths	 case	 the	Court	 appled	 the	 double	 jeopardy	prohbton	 n	
the	absence	of	a	former	verdct	of	acquttal	or	convcton	and	therefore	s	not	
strctly	speakng	a	double	jeopardy	ssue.	The	more	approprate	course	of	acton,	
gven	the	crcumstances	of	ths	case,	would	have	been	to	nvoke	the	power	of	
the	crmnal	courts	to	estop	a	prosecuton	from	proceedng	where	t	would	be	
napproprate	for	 the	prosecuton	 to	contnue.	The	courts	may	exercse	 ther	
nherent	power	to	prevent	the	contnuance	of	proceedngs	that	would	consttute	
an	abuse	of	the	process	of	court.64	Consequently,	whle	ths	decson	effectvely	
confers	consttutonal	 status	on	 the	double	 jeopardy	prncple	 n	accordance	
wth	artcle	8.,	t	must	be	read	wth	a	degree	of	crcumspecton	as	there	was	
no	former	verdct	of	acquttal	or	convcton	upon	whch	 to	 rase	 the	specal	
pleas	 n	bar.	Ths	decson	could	also	be	 nterpreted	as	conferrng	a	broader	
applcaton	 of	 double	 jeopardy	 law	 thus	 ncorporatng	 the	 courts	 nherent	
power	 to	prevent	 the	abuse	of	 the	process	of	court;	 n	 ths	context	 t	would	
be	applcable	notwthstandng	the	absence	of	a	former	verdct	of	acquttal	or	
convcton.	on	appeal,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	the	double	jeopardy	prncple	
had	no	applcaton	to	the	crcumstances	of	ths	case	as	the	applcant	had	not	
been acquitted or convicted. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the order 
of	the	Hgh	Court	on	the	grounds	of	abuse	of	prosecutoral	dscreton	and	far	
procedures;	t	would	be	oppressve	and	unfar	to	nstgate	a	thrd	tral.65
substantive or procedural Constitutional right?
a	fundamental	ssue	regardng	the	consttutonal	status	of	double	jeopardy	s	
whether	t	s	a	substantve	or	procedural	rght.66	The	ssue	here	s	whether	the	
64.	 See	andrew	Choo,	Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings	
(2nd	 ed,	oxford	Unversty	 Press,	 2008);	andrew	Choo,	 “Haltng	Crmnal	
Proceedngs:	The	abuse	of	Process	doctrne	revsted”	 (995)	Crim LR 864;	
rosemary	Pattenden,	“abuse	of	Process	n	Crmnal	Ltgaton”	(989)	5	Journal 
of Criminal Law	4.
65.	 DS v Judges of the Cork Circuit Court and the DPP	0	June	2008	(SC).
66.	 Cf	 Larry	alexander,	 “are	Procedural	rghts	dervatve	Substantve	rghts?”	
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accused is confined to pleading double jeopardy at the beginning or during 
the	course	of	a	crmnal	tral,	or	alternatvely	whether	the	accused	s	permtted	
to	rase	the	specal	pleas	n	bar,	autrefois acquit	and	autrefois convict,	when	
ntally	 charged	wth	 the	 commsson	 of	 a	 crmnal	 offence.	 If	 the	 double	
jeopardy	prncple	s	a	substantve	consttutonal	rght	the	prosecuton	would	
be	estopped	from	ndctng	the	accused	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	for	whch	
he	had	formerly	been	acqutted	or	convcted	followng	a	tral	on	the	merts.	
Conversely,	a	procedural	rght	could	be	pleaded	ether	at	the	outset	or	durng	
the	course	of	the	crmnal	tral.
a	tral	“n	due	course	of	law”	as	mandated	by	artcle	8.	does	not	delmt	
the	rghts	of	the	accused	to	ensure	a	far	and	mpartal	n	accordance	wth	ths	
consttutonal	 provson.	referrng	 to	 ths	 ambguty	 n	The State (Healy) v 
Donoghue,	Gannon	J	consdered	artcle	8.	to	be:
…	a	phrase	of	very	wde	mport	whch	ncludes	n	ts	scope	not	merely	
matters	of	consttutonal	and	statutory	jursdcton,	the	range	of	legslaton	
wth	respect	to	crmnal	offences,	and	matters	of	practce	and	procedure,	
but	also	the	applcaton	of	basc	prncples	of	justce	whch	are	nherent	
n	the	proper	course	of	the	exercse	of	the	judcal	functon.67
Gannon	J	refers	to	“matters	of	practce	and	procedure”	whch	could	ndcate	that	
the	double	jeopardy	prncple	s	a	procedural	rght.	However,	f	the	common	law	
mmunty	aganst	retrals	s	a	consttutonal	rght	to	far	procedures,	the	ssue	s	
whether the protection this confined to ensuring that the accused is tried “in due 
course	of	law,”	that	s,	a	tral	accordng	to	postvely	enacted	laws.	alternatvely,	
a	substantve	consttutonal	rght	aganst	double	jeopardy	n	accordance	wth	
artcle	8.	could	be	nterpreted	as	proscrbng	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	
offence	ab initio as	a	retral	n	these	crcumstances	would	not	be	“n	due	course	
of	law”	n	vew	of	the	fact	that	the	gult	or	nnocence	of	the	accused	was	formerly	
determned	by	a	court	of	competent	crmnal	jursdcton.68
Given the stipulation in Article 38.1, and the unenumerated rights identified 
(998)	7	Law and Philosophy	9;	Larry	alexander,	“The	relatonshp	Between	
Procedural	due	 Process	 and	 Substantve	Consttutonal	 rghts”	 (987)	 9	
University of Florida Law Review	2.
67.	 [976]	Ir	25	(HC),	at	5.
68. Substantive law defines the legal relationships (rights and duties) between citizens 
and	also	between	ctzens	and	the	State,	whch	may	be	contrasted	wth	procedural	
rules	of	law	that	provde	the	machnery	for	enforcng	those	rghts	and	dutes;	the	
method	by	whch	substantve	law	s	admnstered.	In	the	crmnal	justce	process,	
substantive law defines criminal offences, defences and punishments, whereas 
procedural	law	s	desgned	to	ensure	a	far,	consstent	and	mpartal	applcaton	
of	due	process	values.	
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by	 the	 superor	 courts	 n	 accordance	wth	 ths	 provson,69	 consttutonal	
protection against double jeopardy could be identified as a procedural right. 
However,	procedural	rules	are	more	concerned	wth	the	adjudcaton	process	
n	the	crmnal	tral	rather	than	conferrng	any	substantve	rght	on	the	accused,	
and	therefore	may	not	n	fact	mert	consttutonal	status.	They	would	nstead	be	
provded	for	under	relevant	crmnal	procedure	legslaton.	The	consttutonal	
rght	aganst	double	jeopardy	s	more	aptly	descrbed	as	a	substantve	rght	n	
the	crmnal	justce	process	especally	n	consderaton	of	the	ratonale	for	the	
development	of	the	double	jeopardy	prncple	at	common	law.70	
hypothesis 
an	applcant	 seekng	 relef	under	artcle	8.	must	establsh	 that	 there	 s	a	
“real	or	serous	rsk”	that	he	would	not	receve	a	tral	“n	due	course	of	law.”7	
Consequently,	 t	 s	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 protecton	 aganst	 double	
jeopardy	s	an	mplct	rght	n	accordance	wth	ths	consttutonal	provson,	
thus	prohbtng	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	followng	an	acquttal	or	
convcton	on	the	merts	by	a	court	of	competent	crmnal	jursdcton.	
a	tral	“n	due	course	of	law”	as	mandated	by	artcle	8.	s	a	fundamental	
requrement	of	crmnal	justce	systems	n	lberal	democraces.	It	stpulates,	inter 
alia,	that	durng	the	course	of	a	crmnal	tral	the	accused	s	presumed	nnocent	
of	the	crmnal	charges	n	the	ndctment	untl	proven	gulty	followng	a	tral	
on	the	merts;72	the	rght	of	appeal	aganst	convcton;7	and	the	rght	not	to	be	
retred	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.74	It	follows	that	ths	consttutonal	provson	
ncorporates	the	unenumerated	consttutonal	rght	aganst	retrals,	or	ndeed	
the	mposton	of	multple	punshments	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.	Ths	s	
significant for the accused in view of the fact that an unenumerated constitutional 
rght	aganst	double	jeopardy	s	a	fundamental	rght	aganst	retrals	as	opposed	
to	a	common	law	prncple	per se.
Certan	 rghts	 and	prncples	 are	desgned	 to	 ensure	 that	 n	 the	 nterests	
69.	 See	Hogan	and	Whyte,	note	28,	at	050-4;	Report of the Constitution Review 
Group,	note	,	at	9-9.
70.	 See	text	accompanyng	notes	2-4.
7.	 JO’C v Director of Public	Prosecutions	[2000]		Ir	478,	at	485	(SC),	per	Keane	
CJ;	Z v Director of Public Prosecutions [994]	2	Ir	476,	at	506-507	(SC),	per	
fnlay	CJ;	D v Director	of Public Prosecutions	[994]	2	Ir	465,	at	467	(SC),	per	
fnlay	CJ.
72.	 O’Leary v Attorney General	[995]		Ir	254	(SC).
7.	 The	People (AG) v Conmey	[975]	Ir	4	(SC).	See	James	Casey,	“Confuson	n	
Crmnal	appeals:	The	Legacy	of	Conmey”	(975)	0	Ir Jur	27;	James	Casey,	
“Crmnal	appeals:	The	Confuson	Perssts”	(98)	6	Ir Jur	27;	Gerard	Hogan,	
“Crmnal	appeals:	a	New	departure”	(98)	5	DULJ 254.
74.	 The People (DPP) v O’Shea	[982]	Ir	82	(SC).
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of	justce	the	accused	receves	a	far	crmnal	tral	n	accordance	wth	artcle	
38.1. A large body of case law has identified these rights and principles and the 
Consttuton	revew	Group	has	recommended	that	the	protectons,	whch	are	
mplct	n	ths	consttutonal	provson,	should	be	made	explct	and	that	the	
rghts	protected	by	t	should	be	enumerated.75	among	these	s	the	rght	“not	to	
be	tred	a	second	tme	for	the	same	offence	followng	upon	a	vald	convcton	
or	acquttal.”76	The	revew	Group	concluded	that	the	double	jeopardy	prncple	
s	an	unenumerated	consttutonal	rght	n	accordance	wth	artcle	8..	
The	Consttuton	s	“the	fundamental	law	of	the	State.”77	as	a	general	rule,	
the	consttutonal	 status	of	double	 jeopardy	 n	accordance	wth	artcle	8.	
would	 be	 superor	 to	 common	 law	 and	 legslaton	 purportng	 to	 assert	 the	
contrary,78	although	t	could	be	curtaled	by	legslaton.	Indeed,	the	Report of 
the Constitution Review Group	noted,	“[t]he	fact	that	the	rght	n	queston	has	
been	held	to	be	mplctly	protected	by	artcle	8.	does	not,	however,	mean	
that	t	cannot	be	valdly	restrcted	where	approprate	by	the	oreachtas.”79
Ths	may	prove	to	be	a	contentous	ssue	when	the	oreachtas	ultmately	
adopts	the	polcy	of	several	common	law	jursdctons	where	the	double	jeopardy	
prncple	has	been	reformed	thus	provdng	a	statutory	excepton	where	fresh	
and	 compellng	 evdence	 of	 the	 accused’s	 gult	 s	 dscovered	 followng	 an	
acquttal.80	
In	 vew	 of	 the	 fact	 that	artcle	 8.	 ncorporates	 the	 double	 jeopardy	
75.	 Report of the Constitution Review Group,	note	,	at	9.	Ths	could	be	done	n	
terms	that	would	provde	consttutonal	protecton	for	defendants	aganst	retrals	
or	 the	 mposton	of	multple	punshments	 for	 the	same	crmnal	offence.	Ths	
could	 also	permt	 the	oreachtas	 to	make	 legslatve	provson	 for	 the	dPP	 to	
make	one	applcaton	for	a	retral	n	the	case	of	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	
of	gult	or	 ndeed	where	 there	has	been	a	 tanted	acquttal.	Ths	would	accord	
wth	the	proposed	reform	of	the	double	jeopardy	prncple	n	ths	jursdcton	and	
would	also	safeguard	the	fundamental	rght	of	the	accused	aganst	more	than	one	
applcaton	for	retral,	whch	could	requre	a	consttutonal	referendum	as	opposed	
to	amendng	proposed	reformng	legslaton.
76.	 Ibid,	at	92-9.
77.	 The	People (DPP) v O’Shea	[982]	Ir	84,	at	97	(SC),	per o’Hggns	CJ.
78.	 See	TrS	allan,	 “Consttutonal	rghts	 and	Common	Law”	 (99)	 	Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 453, at 456, stating “[t]here are… some significant 
dfferences	 between	 the	 common	 law	protecton	 of	 ndvdual	 rghts	 and	 that	
afforded	by	 formally	 enacted	blls	 of	 rghts,	 especally	when	 accompaned	by	
a	power	of	judcal	revew	of	legslaton.”	See	albhe	o’Nell,	“The	effect	of	a	
fndng	that	Legslaton	s	Unconsttutonal:	The	approach	of	the	Irsh	Supreme	
Court”	(2007)	6	Common Law World Review	220.
79.	 Report of the Constitution Review Group,	note ,	at	94.
80.	 See	Gerard	Hogan,	Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group Final Report	
(March,	 2007),	 at	 20-24.	www.justce.e/en/JeLr/Balancerpt.pdf/fles/
Balancerpt.pdf	(vsted	26	august	2008).	
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prncple,	t	follows	that	ths	consttutonal	provson	s	not	purely	a	procedural	
guarantee	n	the	crmnal	justce	process.
trIal by Jury
Wth	noted	exceptons	artcle	8.5	provdes	that	“no	person	shall	be	tred	on	
any	crmnal	charge	wthout	a	jury.”	In	The People (DPP) v O’Shea, Henchy	
J	stated:	
I am satisfied that the indissoluble attachment to trial by jury of the right 
after	acquttal	to	rase	the	plea	of	autrefois acquit was	one	of	the	prme	
reasons	why	the	Consttuton	of	97	(lke	that	of	922)	mandated	tral	
wth	a	jury	as	the	normal	mode	of	tryng	major	offences.8
This provision affirms the constitutional status of the double jeopardy principle 
on	the	bass	that	n	the	case	of	a	tral	on	ndctment	once	the	jury	has	determned	
the	gult	or	nnocence,	the	accused	could	thereafter	rase	the	specal	pleas	n	
bar	aganst	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.	a	purported	retral	n	these	
crcumstances	would	consttute	a	volaton	not	only	of	the	common	law	prncple	
aganst	double	jeopardy	but	also	of	the	defendant’s	rght	to	tral	by	jury	and	
finality of verdict in the criminal justice process.82	Gven	 that	artcle	 8.5	
suggests	a	prncple	aganst	retrals	for	jury	trals,	then	artcle	40.,	the	equalty	
guarantee,	would	provde	an	extenson	of	the	prncple	to	other	types	of	trals.	
artcle	 5	 of	 the	 Consttuton	 provdes	 that	 “Ireland	 s	 a	 soveregn,	
ndependent,	 democratc	 state,”	whch	denotes	 that	 government	 authorty	 s	
derved	from	the	consent	of	the	governed	and	the	People	mantan	legtmacy	
through	partcpaton	n	a	representatve	democracy.	Popular	soveregnty,	that	
s,	the	State	s	the	creaton	of	the	People,8	s	also	expressed	by	the	Preamble.	
Legtmate	 authorty	 of	 government	 s	 derved	 from	 the	 consent	 of	 the	
governed,84	and	n	consttutonal	democraces	the	People	delegate	authorty	and	
confer legitimacy while retaining sovereignty, thus possessing the final check 
on	governmental	authorty.85	
8.	 [982]	Ir	84	(SC),	at	42.
82.	 Cf	 Ian	denns,	“rethnkng	double	Jeopardy:	 Justce	and	fnalty	 n	Crmnal	
Process”	(2000) Crim LR	9.
8.	 In	de Búrca v Attorney General	[976]	Ir	8,	at	47	(HC	&	SC),	Prngle	J	stated	
“[a]	democracy…	s	a	form	of	government	n	whch	the	soveregn	power	resdes	
n	the	people	as	a	whole	and	s	exercsed	by	the	people	ether	drectly	or	through	
ther	elected	representatves.”
84.	 See	the	judgment	of	Walsh	J	n	Webb v Ireland	[988]	Ir	5 (SC),	and	also	n	
Byrne v Ireland	[972]	Ir	24 (SC).	
85.	 Cf	davd	Gwynn	Morgan,	Constitutional Law of Ireland: The Law of the Executive, 
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Dawson contends that the concept of popular sovereignty should be final 
and	unappealable.86	Thus,	the	prosecuton	authortes	must	not	undermne	ths	
process	by	dsregardng	the	verdct	of	the	jury	and	re-prosecutng	an	accused	for	
the	same	crmnal	offence.	It	s	arguable	that	n	consderaton	of	a	jury	verdct	of	
acquttal	or	convcton	that	the	prosecuton	authortes	should	not	be	authorsed	
to	revew	ths	verdct	wth	the	objectve	of	reprosecutng	an	accused	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence.	Conversely,	what	must	also	be	consdered	s	that	the	jury’s	
determnaton	occasonally	must be	reconcled	wth	human	nfallblty	wth	the	
result	that	verdct	of	the	jury	should	not	necessarly	be	unalterable.	
equalIty In the crImInal JustIce process
artcle	40.,	provdes	that	“all	ctzens	shall,	as	human	persons,	be	held	equal	
before	the	law.”	Ths	provson	was	desgned	to	prevent	“arbtrary,	unreasonable	
or	unjust	(nvdous)	dscrmnaton.”87	The	equalty	guarantee	may	be	nvoked	to	
strke	down	legslaton,	or	any	provson	thereof,	that	s	deemed	unconsttutonal,	
and	s	also	applcable	to	common	law	rules	n	the	crmnal	justce	process.88	
Thus,	n	The State (DPP) v Walsh,89	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	common	law	
defence	of	martal	coercon,	whch	was	only	avalable	to	a	wfe	who	allegedly	
commtted	a	crmnal	offence	n	the	presence	of	her	husband,	dd	not	survve	
the	enactment	of	the	Consttuton.
artcle	40.	may	be	nvoked	n	support	of	the	thess	that	the	common	law	
prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy	has	consttutonal	status	where	an	accused	
s	ndcted	on	a	second	occason	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	followng	an	
acquttal	or	convcton.	There	could	be	an	ssue	of	consttutonal	nequalty	n	
the	crmnal	justce	process	f	t	could	be	establshed	that	ndvduals	n	smlar	
crcumstances	have	not	been	ndcted	and	tred,	or	ndeed	retred,	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence.
If	the	consttutonal	protecton	aganst	double	jeopardy	were	applcable	only	
to	trals	on	ndctment	there	could	also	be	ssues	of	consttutonal	nequalty	n	
the	crmnal	justce	process.	In	The People (DPP) v Quilligan	(No 2),	Henchy	
J	n	the	context	of	the	court’s	jursdcton	to	order	a	retral	stated:
Legislature and Judicature	(2nd	ed,	round	Hall	Press,	990),	at	28,	crtcsng	the	
distinction between the People and the State as they are “artificial entities, with 
no	clear	demarcaton	of	purpose	between	 them”	and	 argung	 that	 there	 s	 “no	
advantage	to	analyse	them	as	legally	dstnct	bodes.”
86.	 Mchael	dawson,	“Popular	Soveregnty,	double	Jeopardy	and	the	dual	Soveregnty	
doctrne”	(992)	02	Yale Law Journal	28,	at	282-28.	
87.	 O’B v S	[984]	Ir	6,	at	5	(SC),	per	Walsh	J.
88.	 See	oran	doyle,	Constitutional Equality Law	(round	Hall,	2004),	at	76-84.
89.	 [98]	Ir	42	(SC).
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…	f	the	legslature	were	to	confer	a	jursdcton	to	order	a	retral	n	a	case	
of	acquttal	n	a	tral	on	ndctment,	such	a	statutory	provson	would	have	
to	comply	wth	the	consttutonal	requrement	as	to	equalty	before	the	law.	
Its	consttutonalty	on	that	score	would	be	questonable	f	t	unequally	
and	selectvely	appled	only	to	appeals	from	the	Central	Crmnal	Court.	
Whereas,	f	t	appled	to	all	trals	on	ndctment,	ts	consttutonalty	mght	
also	be	open	to	queston	on	grounds	such	as	that	t	would	not	accord	wth	
fundamental	 farness	 or	 that	 t	would	 not	 be	 compatble	wth	what	 s	
nherent	n	the	consttutonal	guarantee	of	tral	by	jury.90
If,	 n	 other	words,	 the	 consttutonal	 rght	 aganst	 double	 jeopardy	were	
applcable	only	to	the	tral	of	offences	on	ndctment	ths	could	be	consttutonally	
suspect	for	falng	to	accord	protecton	aganst	retrals	for	summary	offences.	
Conversely,	an	argument	can	be	made	that	the	abuse	of	process	doctrne	s	more	
relevant	n	the	case	of	summary	offences	rather	than	a	strct	applcaton	of	the	
double	jeopardy	prncple.
a	convcton	for	an	ndctable	offence	typcally	results	n	the	deprvaton	
of personal liberty in accordance with a sentence of a specified term of 
mprsonment,	n	addton	to	the	adverse	socal	stgma	assocated	wth	a	crmnal	
tral	and	convcton	for	a	serous	crmnal	offence.	In	crcumstances	where	the	
accused	has	been	charged	wth	a	multplcty	of	summary	offences	ths	may	
have	the	combned	effect	of	causng	a	consderable	measure	of	(unreasonable)	
harassment	and	dstress	to	the	accused.	a	case	n	pont	s	the	scenaro	nvolvng	
Mr	McBrearty	wheren	the	accused	was	ssued	wth	more	than	60	summonses	
mainly relating to alleged breaches of licensing laws and road traffic offences.9	
although	all	of	the	summonses	were	subsequently	wthdrawn	the	combned	
effect	of	such	a	prosecuton,	f	the	accused	were	convcted	on	all	charges,	would	
undoubtedly	have	the	effect	of	unduly	dstressng	the	accused,	perhaps	to	the	
extent	of	beng	charged	wth	an	ndctable	offence.	accordngly,	f	an	accused	
has	been	acqutted	of	a	multtude	of	summary	offences	and	 the	prosecuton	
authortes	subsequently	ssue	fresh	summonses	for	these	same	offences,	ths	
could	consttute	an	 nfrngement	of	 the	 fundamental	 ratonale	of	 the	double	
jeopardy	 prncple.	Therefore,	 the	 consttutonal	 protecton	 aganst	 double	
jeopardy	would	be	avalable	to	an	accused	charged	wth	ndctable	and	summary	
offences,	and	offences	trable	ether	way.	However,	n	the	McBrearty case,	as	
the	summonses	were	subsequently	wthdrawn	and	the	case	dd	not	proceed	to	
verdct,	the	approprate	course	of	acton	would	be	to	prevent	the	prosecutng	
authortes	from	re-ssung	the	summonses	as	ths	would	consttute	an	abuse	
of	the	process	of	the	court	rather	than	an	applcaton	of	the	double	jeopardy	
principle, which is predicated on a final verdict of acquittal or conviction.92
90.	 [989]	Ir	46	(SC),	at	56.
9.	 McBrearty v Judge O’Donnell and DPP	22	November	999	(SC).
92.	 See	denns, note	88,	at 95,	statng:	
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artcle	 40.	may	 support	 the	 consttutonal	 status	 of	 the	 common	 law	
prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy.	The	equalty	guarantee	may	be	nvoked	by	
an	accused	where	t	s	alleged	that	a	statute	(or	provson	thereof)	or	common	
law	rule	pertanng	to	double	jeopardy	law	s	arbtrary	or	unreasonable	n	the	
crmnal	justce	process.
personal rIghts agaInst retrIals
artcle	40..°	of	the	Consttuton	provdes	that	“the	State	guarantees	n	ts	laws	
to	respect,	and,	as	far	as	practcable,	by	ts	laws	to	defend	and	vndcate	the	
personal	rghts	of	the	ctzen.”9	It	s	an	establshed	prncple	of	consttutonal	
nterpretaton	that	certan	provsons	should	be	construed	based	on	a	herarchy	of	
consttutonal	rghts.	In	The	State (Healy) v Donoghue,	Ó	Hggns	CJ	stated:	
Article 38 deals specifically with a criminal trial and provides that no 
person	should	be	tred	on	any	crmnal	charge	save	n	due	course	of	law.	
Ths	artcle	must	be	consdered	n	conjuncton	wth	artcle	4…	[and]	
wth	artcle	40..°….	Beng	 so	consdered,	 t	 s	 clear	 that	 the	words	
“due	course	of	law”	n	artcle	8	make	t	mandatory	that	every	crmnal	
tral	shall	be	conducted	n	accordance	wth	the	concept	of	 justce,	 that	
the	procedures	appled	shall	be	far,	and	that	the	person	accused	wll	be	
afforded	 every	 opportunty	 to	 defend	hmself.	 If	 ths	were	 not	 so,	 the	
dgnty	of	the	ndvdual	would	be	gnored	and	the	State	would	have	faled	
to	vndcate	hs	personal	rghts.94
Consequently,	 a	 far	 tral	 n	 accordance	wth	artcle	 8	 s	 guaranteed	 by	
the	Consttuton	 and	 a	 falure	 by	 the	 State	 to	 “defend	 and	 vndcate”	 ths	
consttutonal	rght	would	consttute	an	nfrngement	of	the	accused’s	personal	
rghts	 n	 the	 crmnal	 justce	 process.	Ths	 mples	 that	 the	State	would	 be	
prohbted	from	retryng	an	accused	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	followng	a	
tral	on	the	merts	by	a	court	of	competent	crmnal	jursdcton.	In	D v Director 
of Public Prosecutions,	denham	J	stated:	
The	protecton	does	not	take	the	form	of	a	sngle	self-contaned	rule	smlar	
to	that	contaned	n	the	human	rghts	nstruments.	In	essence	t	conssts	of	a	
core	 rule	of	 crmnal	 jursdcton,	 supplemented	by	a	 judcal	dscreton	 to	
stay	crmnal	proceedngs	on	the	ground	that	 they	are	an	abuse	of	process.	
The	core	rule	comprses	the	old	pleas	n	bar	of	jursdcton,	namely	autrefois 
acquit	and	autrefois convict.
9.	 See	rfV	Heuston,	“Personal	rghts	Under	the	Irsh	Consttuton”	(976)		Ir 
Jur	205;	Report of the Constitution Review Group,	note	,	at	246-247.
94.	 [976]	Ir	25	(SC),	at	49.
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The	 applcant’s	 consttutonal	 rghts	must	 be	 protected.	Under	 the	
Consttuton,	artcle	8.:	 -	“No	person	shall	be	 tred	on	any	crmnal	
charge	save	n	due	course	of	law.”	The	unenumerated	rghts	of	artcle	40.	
ncorporate	a	rght	to	farness	of	procedures….	The	applcant’s	rght	to	a	
far	tral	s	one	of	the	most	fundamental	consttutonal	rghts	accorded	to	
persons.	on	a	herarchy	of	consttutonal	rghts	t	s	a	superor	rght.95
The	purported	retral	of	an	accused,	notwthstandng	a	former	verdct	of	acquttal	
for	the	crmnal	offence,	would	consttute	a	volaton	of	the	consttutonal	rght	to	
a	far	tral	“n	due	course	of	law.”	Moreover,	n	the	case	of	a	retral	for	the	same	
offence	the	personal	rghts	of	the	ctzen	to	“farness	of	procedures”	mght	also	
be	nfrnged.	The	fundamental	njustce	n	prosecutng	an	accused	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence	followng	an	acquttal	or	convcton	necesstates	nterventon	
of	the	Consttuton	“as	the	fundamental	law	of	the	State.”96	
In	 a	 consttutonal	 democracy	 t	 s	 clear	 that	 the	 personal	 rghts	 of	 the	
ctzen	nclude	the	rght	not	to	be	unduly	harassed	by	the	State	through	repeated	
attempts	to	prosecute	and	convct	an	accused	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.	
Consequently,	the	prosecuton	of	an	accused	on	more	than	one	occason	for	the	
same	offence	would	consttute	a	volaton	of	the	accused’s	consttutonal	rght	
to	far	procedures.97	furthermore,	the	adverse	standng	of	the	accused	n	the	
crmnal	justce	process,	as	opposed	to	the	power	and	resources	avalable	to	the	
State	n	the	prosecuton	of	crmnal	offences,	necesstates	the	nterventon	of	
the	consttutonal	protecton	aganst	such	procedures.
It is significant that Article 40.3.1° includes the term “as far as practicable” 
which signifies that this is not an absolute guarantee to “defend and vindicate the 
personal	rghts	of	the	ctzen,”	as	t	s	subject	to	approprate	exceptons	where	
ths	 s	 necesstated	based	on	 a	herarchy	of	 consttutonal	 rghts.	Therefore,	
assumng	 the	double	 jeopardy	prncple	 s	 a	personal	 rght	of	 the	 ctzen,	 t	
would	not	be	an	absolute	rght	but	rather	subservent	to	other	provsons	based	
on	a	herarchy	of	consttutonal	rghts	n	the	crmnal	justce	process.	Ths	s	
significant for the collective interests of society to ensure that individuals who 
have	commtted	serous	crmnal	offences	are	tred	and	punshed	accordngly,	
even	f	ths	nvolves	a	retral	for	the	same	offence	such	as	n	the	case	of	a	mstral,	
or	possbly	a	retral	followng	an	acquttal	where	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	
of	the	accused’s	gult	s	subsequently	dscovered.
Whle	 ths	 consttutonal	 provson	would	 not	 by	 tself	 ncorporate	 an	
95.	 [994]	2	Ir	465	(SC),	at	47-474.
96.	 The	People (DPP) v O’Shea	[982]	Ir	84,	at	97	(SC), per	o’Hggns	CJ.
97.	 In re Haughey	[97]	Ir	27	(SC),	at	264,	o’dálagh	CJ	stated:	“artcle	40.,	of	
the	Consttuton	s	a	guarantee	to	the	ctzen	of	basc	farness	of	procedures.	The	
Consttuton	guarantees	such	farness	and	t	s	the	duty	of	the	Court	to	underlne	
that	the	words	of	artcle	40.	are	not	poltcal	shbboleths	but	provde	a	postve	
protecton	for	the	ctzen.…”	
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unenumerated	consttutonal	rght	aganst	retrals	for	the	same	crmnal	offence,	
t	may	be	nvoked	n	support	a	more	substantve	lne	of	reasonng	n	favour	
of	a	consttutonal	rght	aganst	beng	placed	twce	n	jeopardy	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence.98	
multIple punIshments for the same crImInal offence
artcle	 40.4.°	 provdes	 that	 “no	 ctzen	 shall	 be	 deprved	 of	 hs	 personal	
lberty	save	n	accordance	wth	law.”	Ths	provson	s	pertnent	to	the	double	
jeopardy	proscrpton	gven	that	a	convcton	by	a	court	of	competent	crmnal	
jursdcton	typcally	results	n	the	deprvaton	of	personal	lberty	n	accordance	
with a specified term of imprisonment.99	In	The	State (Tynan) v Keane,	Henchy	
J	stated:	
[The	applcant]…	says	he	has	a	rght	not	to	be	put	n	perl	of	beng	deprved	
of	hs	lberty	agan	for	the	same	offence….	He	could	have	nvoked	and,	
n	fact,	dd	nvoke	artcle	40,	secton	4,	subs	°,	of	the	Consttuton	n	
respect	of	 that	 mprsonment.	That	 s	 the	only	consttutonal	provson	
relied on today, but I find it inapplicable to the present position under the 
pendng	summons….	The	fact	that	the	applcant	has	served	part	of	a	vod	
sentence	of	mprsonment	does	not,	on	consttutonal	or	other	grounds,	
debar	a	new	tral	for	the	same	offence.	The	Court	of	Crmnal	appeal	has	
never	consdered	that	ts	jursdcton	to	order	a	new	tral	s	nhbted	by	
the	fact	that	an	appellant	has	served	part	of	the	quashed	sentence.00
The	mprsonment	of	a	defendant	followng	a	convcton	by	a	court	of	competent	
crmnal	jursdcton	followng	a	tral	on	the	merts	consttutes	punshment	by	
means	of	the	deprvaton	of	“personal	lberty…	n	accordance	wth	law.”0	If	
the	crmnal	tral	had	proceeded	on	the	merts	of	the	case	concludng	n	a	verdct	
of	acquttal	or	convcton,	then	a	purported	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	
resultng	n	the	deprvaton	of	personal	lberty	would	consttute	an	nfrngement	
of	artcle	40.4.°.	However,	n	ths	nstance	the	convcton	was	quashed	on	the	
bass	that	t	was	ultra vires	the	jursdcton	of	the	tral	court	and	therefore	vod	
ab initio.	Consequently,	n	these	crcumstances	there	s	no	legal	mpedment	per 
98.	 See	Report of the Constitution Review Group,	note	,	at	247,	statng	“[t]he	broad	
wordng	of	artcle	40...° has had the important advantage of being flexible and 
allowng	the	scope	of	consttutonal	protectons	to	develop	gradually	and	to	be	
extended	to	new	mportant	areas….”
99.	 The State (Cannon) v Kavanagh	[97]	Ir	428	(HC).
00.	 [968]	Ir	48	(HC),	at	50.	
0.	 See	the	judgment	by	o’Hggns	CJ	n	The State (McDonagh) v Frawley	[978]	
Ir	,	at	6-7	(SC).
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se	aganst	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	offence,	provded	that	the	defendant	
s	credted	wth	the	perod	of	mprsonment	served	on	the	orgnal,	albet	vod,	
convcton.02 This is significant in view of the fact that the principle against 
double	jeopardy	was	not	only	desgned	to	prevent	multple	prosecutons	but	
also	operates	to	prevent	the	mposton	of	multple	punshments	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence.0	
Whereas the deprivation of liberty may be imposed subsequent to a finding 
of	gult,	the	ratonale	for	pleadng	double	jeopardy	s	to	prevent	a	second	tral	
for	the	same	offence	from	proceedng	ab initio.	Thus,	whle	ths	consttutonal	
provson	has	double	jeopardy	connotatons	t	does	not	by	tself	form	the	bass	
of	the	consttutonal	rght	aganst	double	jeopardy.	Nevertheless,	ths	provson	
may provide influential assistance in support of a more pertinent line of reasoning 
n	favour	of	a	consttutonal	rght	aganst	retrals	and	the	mposton	of	multple	
punshments	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.
an unqualIfIed constItutIonal rIght?
The	Consttuton	clearly	stpulates	that	certan	provsons	are	not	absolute	but	
rather	subject	to	exceptons	n	approprate	crcumstances.	a	fundamental	ssue	
to	be	resolved	s	whether	the	consttutonal	protecton	aganst	double	jeopardy	
s	an	uncondtonal	rght	or	alternatvely	subject	to	an	excepton	where	fresh	
and	compellng	evdence	of	gult	s	dscovered	followng	an	acquttal.	Ths	s	
significant in the light of recent and proposed legislative reforms of double 
jeopardy	law	n	several	common	law	jursdctons,	ncludng	Ireland.04	These	
reforms	do	not	advocate	a	complete	abolton	of	 the	common	 law	prncple	
but	rather	that	t	would	be	subject	to	an	excepton	where	fresh	and	compellng	
evdence	 of	 the	 gult	 s	 dscovered	 followng	 an	 acquttal,	 especally	 n	
consderaton	of	new	forensc	procedures	for	gatherng	evdence	of	crmnal	
actvty.	
an	accused	could	be	retred	where	hs	convcton	has	been	quashed	or	where	
there	had	been	procedural	rregulartes,	such	as	a	tanted	acquttal,	that	nullfy	
the	former	crmnal	 tral.	Consequently,	 the	consttutonal	protecton	aganst	
double	jeopardy	would	not	preclude	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	offence	n	
02.	 See	text	accompanyng	note	4.
0.	 The	proscrpton	 aganst	 the	 mposton	of	multple	 punshments	 for	 the	 same	
offence,	 under	 common	 law	 or	 statute,	 s	 provded	 for	 by	 secton	 4	 of	 the	
Interpretaton	act	97	whch	provdes:	“Where	any	act,	whether	of	commsson	
or	omsson,	consttutes	an	offence	under	two	or	more	statutes	or	under	a	statute	
and	at	common	law,	the	offender	shall,	unless	the	contrary	ntenton	appears,	be	
lable	to	be	prosecuted	and	punshed	under	ether	or	any	of	those	statutes	or	at	
common	law,	but	shall	not	be	lable	to	be	punshed	twce	for	the	same	offence.”
04.	 See	text	accompanyng	notes 9-27.
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crcumstances	where	the	former	crmnal	tral	was	quashed	on	appeal	on	the	bass	
that	the	decson	of	the	tral	court	was	ultra vires,	or	the	tral	court	was	deemed	
a	coram non judice.05	However,	legslaton	whch	permtted	the	prosecuton	
authortes	 to	petton	the	Court	of	Crmnal	appeal	 to	quash	an	acquttal	 n	
the	lght	of	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	of	gult,	and	order	a	retral,	could	
consttute	a	substantal	nroad	n	the	fundamental	rghts	of	the	accused	n	the	
crmnal	justce	process.
The	Consttuton	s	founded	upon	the	premse	inter alia	“that	the	dgnty	
and	freedom	of	the	ndvdual	may	be	assured,	true	socal	order	attaned.”06	
The	contentous	ssue	s	whether	t	would	be	n	the	nterests	of	the	preservaton	
of	a	just	and	ordered	socety	to	uncondtonally	prohbt	retrals	for	the	same	
crmnal	offence	where	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	of	the	accused’s	gult	
s	dscovered	followng	an	acquttal.	The	thess	of	ths	artcle	suggests	that	the	
double jeopardy principle is an unspecified constitutional right in accordance 
wth	artcle	 8..	The	 ssue	 to	 be	 determned	 s	whether	 ths	would	 be	 an	
absolute	rght	or,	alternatvely,	subject	to	a	herarchy	of	consttutonal	rghts;	
thus	permttng	a	retral,	albet	n	strctly	lmted	crcumstances,	by	proposed	
reformng	legslaton.	
Whle	numerous	mplct	rghts	have	been	nterpreted	n	accordance	wth	
artcle	8.	as	essental	to	a	tral	“n	due	course	of	law,”	these	are	not	necessarly	
absolute	rghts.	The	Consttuton	provdes	a	herarchy	of	rghts	and	the	Supreme	
Court has identified certain rights as superior to others in the criminal justice 
process.	In	The People (DPP) v Shaw,	concernng	the	rght	to	lfe	of	the	vctm	
as	opposed	to	the	rght	to	personal	lberty	of	the	accused,	Griffin J explained 
that:	
… the hierarchy or priority of the conflicting rights must be examined, both 
as	between	themselves	and	n	relaton	to	the	general	welfare	of	socety.	Ths	
may	nvolve	the	tonng	down	or	even	the	outng	nto	temporary	abeyance	
of	a	partcular	guaranteed	rght	so	that,	n	a	far	and	objectve	way,	the	
more	pertnent	and	mportant	rght	n	a	gven	set	of	crcumstances	may	
be	preferred	and	gven	applcaton.07	
In	the	context	of	artcle	8.,	o’Hggns	CJ	n	In re	Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) 
05.	 In	these	crcumstances,	as	the	accused	would	not	have	been	n	jeopardy	or	perl	
of	convcton	on	a	former	occason,	there	would	be	no	legal	mpedment	per se 
aganst	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	offence.
06.	 Consttuton	of	Ireland	97,	Preamble,	at	[4].	In	Attorney General v Southern 
Industrial Trust	(957)	94	ILTr	6,	at	75,	Lavery	J	stated	“[t]he	words	of	the	
Preamble	declarng	the	purpose	of	the	People	n	adoptng,	enactng,	and	gvng	
to	themselves	the	Consttuton	may	help	n	determnng	the	meanng	of	and	the	
effect	to	be	gven	to	partcular	provsons.”	
07.	 [982]	Ir		(SC),	at	56.
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Bill 1975,	stated	“[t]he	phrase	‘n	due	course	of	law’	requres	a	far	and	just	
balance	between	the	exercse	of	ndvdual	freedoms	and	the	requrements	of	
an	ordered	socety.”08
While the accused is entitled to the benefit of fair procedures during the 
course	of	the	crmnal	tral,	ths	must	be	reconcled	wth	the	preservaton	of	a	
just	and	ordered	socety	through	the	prosecuton	of	ndvduals	deemed	to	have	
commtted	serous	crmnal	offences.	In	other	words,	the	collectve	nterest	of	a	
democratc	socety	n	the	prosecuton	and	punshment	of	offenders	may	result	
n	 the	accused’s	 rght	 to	a	 tral	“n	due	course	of	 law”	or	what	 s	otherwse	
known	as	the	rght	to	due	process,09	occasonally	beng	subservent	to	socety’s	
collectve	nterest	n	the	nvestgaton	and	prosecuton	of	ndvduals	who	have	
commtted	serous	crmnal	offences.	Ths	s	not	to	suggest	substantal	nroads	n	
the	fundamental	rghts	of	the	accused	n	the	crmnal	justce	process	but	rather	to	
provde	for	an	excepton	n	crcumstances	where	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	
of	the	accused’s	gult	s	dscovered	followng	an	acquttal,	or	ndeed	where	there	
had	been	a	tanted	acquttal.	Ths	s	an	ssue	that	wll	need	to	be	resolved	f	the	
oreachtas	adopts	the	polcy	of	other	common	law	jursdctons	n	reformng	
the	law	on	double	jeopardy	provdng	for	a	statutory	excepton	to	the	double	
jeopardy	prncple.	Would	t	be	n	the	nterests	of	a	justly	ordered	socety	to	
permt	a	prosecuton	for	the	same	offence	followng	an	acquttal,	or	would	ths	
consttute	a	volaton	of	the	accused’s	unenumerated	consttutonal	rght	not	to	
be	placed	twce	n	jeopardy	for	the	same	offence?	Whle	polcy	consderatons	
wll	determne	ths	ssue,	these	may	not	be	determnatve	of	the	consttutonal	
rghts	of	the	accused	n	the	crmnal	justce	process.0	
an	argument	could	be	made	that	there	would	be	no	legal	or	consttutonal	
mpedment	 aganst	 permttng	 retrals	 n	 lmted	 crcumstances	 as	 the	
unenumerated	consttutonal	 rght	aganst	double	 jeopardy	would	be	subject	
to	a	herarchy	of	rghts	n	the	crmnal	justce	process.	as	a	general	rule,	the	
accused’s	rght	to	a	far	tral	s	superor	to	the	collectve	nterests	of	socety	n	
the	prosecuton	of	serous	crmnal	offences.	However,	n	crcumstances	where	
fresh	and	compellng	evdence	of	the	accused’s	gult	s	dscovered	followng	an	
acquttal,	or	where	the	former	crmnal	tral	was	a	nullty,	the	ssue	of	contenton	
s	whether	t	would	be	contrary	to	the	effectve	admnstraton	of	the	crmnal	
08.	 [977]	Ir	29	(SC),	at	52.	In	the	Hgh	Court	decson	of	Enright v Ireland and 
the Attorney General	[200]	2	Ir	2,	fnlay	Geoghegan	J	stated:	“The	guarantee	
of	far	procedures	as	t	apples	to	a	crmnal	tral	under	artcles	8.	and	40.	s	
not	an	absolute	guarantee.”
09.	 See	Barry	Segal,	 “double	 Jeopardy	 and	due	Process”	 (968)	 59	 Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science	247.
0.	 See	Gerard	Coffey,	 “evaluatng	 the	Common	Law	Prncple	 aganst	retrals”	
(2007)	29	DULJ 26.
.	 D v Director of Public Prosecutions	[994]	2	Ir	465	(SC);	Z v Director of Public 
Prosecutions	[994]	2	Ir	476 (HC	&	SC).
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justce	system	of	a	justly	ordered	socety	to	permt	a	retral	for	the	same	crmnal	
offence,	albet	n	strctly	lmted	crcumstances.
It	 s	 mplct	 from	 the	 judgement	 of	o’Hggns	CJ	 n Re	Criminal Law 
(Jurisdiction) Bill 1975	that	a	retral	followng	an	acquttal	could	proceed	n	
accordance	wth	polcy	consderatons	pertanng	to	the	prosecuton	of	ndvduals	
who	have	commtted	serous	crmnal	offences.	Consequently,	the	unenumerated	
consttutonal	rght	aganst	double	jeopardy	n	accordance	wth	artcle	8.	may	
not	be	an	absolute	rght	aganst	retrals	but	rather	subject	to	(proposed)	statutory	
reform	applcable	n	crcumstances	where	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	of	the	
accused’s	gult	s	dscovered	followng	an	acquttal.
In	The	People (DPP) v O’Shea,2	 the	Supreme	Court	held	 that	 the	dPP	
could	appeal	an	acquttal	from	the	Central	Crmnal	Court	to	the	Supreme	Court,	
notwthstandng	the	status	of	the	common	law	prncple	aganst	double	jeopardy	
n	the	Irsh	crmnal	justce	system.	The	Supreme	Court	n O’Shea	adopted	a	
lteral	nterpretaton	of	artcle	4.4.°	and,	n	so	dong,	held	“all	decsons	of	
the	Hgh	Court”	ncludng	an	acquttal	n	the	Central	Crmnal	Court,	could	
be	appealed	to	the	Supreme	Court.	Ths	rulng	has	been	repealed	by	statutory	
provson.4
artcle	4()	of	Protocol	7	to	the	european	Conventon	on	Human	rghts	
provdes	 for	 the	prohbton	aganst	 retrals	 for	 the	 same	offence	wthn	 the	
jursdcton	of	the	same	state.	However,	artcle	4()	eCHr	s	not	an	absolute	
guarantee	aganst	double	jeopardy	and	may	be	crcumvented	n	accordance	wth	
the	law	and	crmnal	procedure	of	sgnatory	states	to	the	eCHr	n	consderaton	
of	fresh	and	compellng	evdence	of	gult,	or	ndeed	where	there	has	been	a	
fundamental	defect	n	the	former	crmnal	proceedngs.5	Gven	the	legal	status	
of the ECHR under Irish law, Article 4 ECHR would provide influential authority 
for	the	oreachtas	and	Irsh	superor	courts	when	determnng	the	consttutonal	
status	of	the	double	jeopardy	prncple.6
2.	 [982]	Ir	84	(SC).	forde,	note	60,	at	47,	wrtes:	
The	appeal	 n	O’Shea	was	aganst	 an	acquttal	 at	 the	drecton	of	 the	 tral	
judge	and	not	an	acquttal	by	the	jury	havng	consdered	the	entre	evdence.	
An acquittal that was secured by flagrantly improper means may very well fall 
wthn	the	autrefois acquit	rule	at	common	law	but	t	s	hardly	protected	by	
whatever	rght	aganst	double	jeopardy	as	exsts	under	the	Consttuton.
.	 an	appeal	from	the	Court	of	Crmnal	appeal	to	the	Supreme	Court	would	therefore	
have	been	excluded	from	ths	process.
4.	 Secton		of	the	Crmnal	Procedure	act	99	as	amended	by	secton	44	of	the	
Court and Court Officers Act 1995, with the exception of an appeal on a point of 
law	to	the	Supreme	Court	wthout	prejudce	to	a	verdct	n	favour	of	the	accused	
under	secton	4	of	the	Crmnal	Procedure	act	967.
5.	 eCHr,	Protocol	7,	artcle	4(2).
6.	 The	european	Conventon	on	Human	rghts	act	200	ncorporated	the	eCHr	
nto	Irsh	domestc	law;	see	Gerard	Hogan,	“The	european	Conventon	on	Human	
rghts	act	200”	(2006)	2	European Public Law	.	
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Whle	 t	 s	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 common	 law	 mmunty	 from	
reprosecuton	s	mplct	n	artcle	8.,	ths	may	not	necessarly	be	an	absolute	
rght	but	 rather	 subject	 to	 (proposed)	 statutory	excepton.	Wth	 reference	 to	
the	statutory	restrcton	of	mplct	rghts	under	artcle	8.,	the	Report of the 
Constitution Review Group	stated:	
Naturally,	such	rghts	should	not	be	gratutously	or	arbtrarly	curtaled	
and,	accordngly,	the	revew	Group	consders	that	any	such	qualfyng	
clause	should	requre	that	any	restrcton	be	proportonate	and	necessary	
to	 safeguard	 mportant	 publc	 nterests,	 such	 as	 the	 protecton	 of	 the	
publc,	[and]	the	detecton	of	crme….	even	applyng	these	prncples,	t	
is difficult to envisage circumstances which would justify qualifying or 
lmtng	some	of	the	rghts	[mplct	n	artcle	8.]….7
In	Heaney v Ireland,	the	Supreme	Court	per o’flaherty	J	stated	that	there	must	
be	“…a	proper	proportonalty	n	the	provson	between	any	nfrngement	of	the	
ctzen’s	rghts	wth	the	enttlement	of	the	State	to	protect	tself.”8	In	the	Hgh	
Court,9	Costello	J	had	held	that	whle	artcle	40.6.º.	protects	the	rght	to	
slence,	as	a	corollary	of	freedom	of	expresson,	t	s	not	an	absolute	rght.	The	
Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	legslatve	provson	at	ssue	was	consttutonal	
notwthstandng	the	fact	that	t	provded	for	an	offence	where	an	accused	faled	
to	answer	questons	regardng	hs	whereabouts	when	arrested.20	furthermore,	
the	Court	held	that	the	provson	had	struck	a	proportonate	balance	between	
the	rghts	of	an	accused	and	the	general	publc	nterest	n	the	prosecuton	of	
serous	crmnal	offences.2	
Where a conflict arises, the superior courts would determine whether a fair 
and	just	balance	was	struck	between	the	nterests	of	socety	n	the	detecton	and	
prosecuton	of	serous	crme	and	the	fundamental	rghts	of	the	accused	n	the	
crmnal	justce	process.	In	A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison,22	the	Supreme	
Court	ndcated	that	the	duty	on	the	State	to	protect	socety,	and	n	partcular	
7.	 Consttuton	revew	Group,	note	,	at	95.
8.	 [996]		Ir	580	(SC),	at	590.
9.	 Heaney v Ireland	[994]		Ir	59	(HC).
20.	 offences	aganst	the	State	act	99,	secton	52.
2.	 See	Ka	Moller,	“Balancng	and	the	Structure	of	Consttutonal	rghts”	(2007)	5	
International Journal of Constitutional Law	45;	robert	alexy,	“Consttutonal	
rghts,	Balancng,	and	ratonalty”	(200)	6	Ratio Juris	;	Ben	emmerson,	
andrew	ashworth	and	alson	Macdonald	eds,	Human Rights and Criminal Justice	
(2nd	ed,	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2007),	at	07-;	Benjamn	Goold,	Lora	Lazarus	and	
Gabrel	Swney,	Public Protection, Proportionality and the Search for Balance	
(Mnstry	of	Justce	research	Seres	No	0,	2007),	at	-2.	www.justce.gov.uk/
publcatons/research270907.htm	(vsted	26	august	2008).
22.	 0	July	2006	(SC).
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vctms	of	crme,	may,	on	occason,	counter-balance	the	rghts	of	the	accused	
n	the	crmnal	justce	process.
If	the	oreachtas	enacts	legslaton	reformng	the	law	on	double	jeopardy	
that	would	make	 provson	 for	 retrals	 n	 crcumstances	where	 fresh	 and	
compellng	evdence	of	gult	s	dscovered	followng	an	acquttal,	ths	should	
not	be	dsproportonate	to	the	objectve	sought	to	be	attaned.2
conclusIon
fundamental	 rghts	 n	 the	 crmnal	 justce	 process	 are	 not	 lmted	 to	 those	
enumerated in the text of the Constitution but have also been identified by the 
superior courts as unspecified or unenumerated constitutional rights. While 
several	provsons	have	been	consdered	as	provdng	the	consttutonal	bass	for	
the	common	law	double	jeopardy	prncple,	t	s	submtted	that	artcle	8.	s	the	
source	of	ths	rght.	However,	n	vew	of	the	fact	that	t	s	an	unenumerated	rght,	
t	seems	lkely	that	the	oreachtas	would	be	permtted	to	enact	legslaton,	or	
statutory	provson,	reformng	the	law	on	double	jeopardy.	Ths	would	empower	
the	Court	of	Crmnal	appeal,	wth	the	possblty	of	an	appeal	to	the	Supreme	
Court,	to	revew	an	acquttal,	whch	may	be	quashed	and	a	retral	ordered	where	
the Court is satisfied that there is fresh and compelling evidence of the accused’s 
gult	or	ndeed	where	there	has	been	a	tanted	acquttal.
The	 law	 on	 double	 jeopardy	was	 not	 desgned	 to	 provde	 absolute	
mmunty	 from	reprosecuton	but	 rather	 to	prohbt	unreasonable	 retrals	by	
the	State.	However,	t	s	essental	that	prospectve	reformng	legslaton	strke	
an	approprate	and	proportonate	balance	between	the	fundamental	rghts	of	
an	accused	n	a	crmnal	tral	and	the	rght	of	socety	to	be	protected	aganst	
serous	crme.
2.	 See	eg Cox v Ireland	[992]	2	Ir	50	(SC)	n	the	context	of	punshment	for	crmnal	
offences	and	legslatve	nterventon	on	personal	rghts.	
